There are few things Americans love more than a story that exposes the stupidity of snobs and pundits. It explains the initial appeal of Donald Trump and the enduring appeal of Michael Crichton’s novels. We need specialists to run our complex economy, but sometimes eggheads are blinded by groupthink and can’t see what’s right in front of their noses.
That’s a theme of Jason Greenblatt’s memoir of his time as former President Trump’s Middle East envoy, In the way of Abraham. As he writes in the introduction, “Most books like this are written by professional politicians or longtime Washington insiders. I am neither of those.” Instead, Greenblatt is a real estate attorney who has worked for years with the Trump administration, an observant Jew and a strong supporter of Israel. In other words, he is the opposite of the typical American diplomat who has managed a stalled Arab-Israeli peace process for the past 30 years.
Greenblatt, along with David Friedman, who served as Trump’s ambassador to Israel, and Jared Kushner, the former president’s son-in-law, oversaw the diplomacy that led to the Abraham Accords in 2020. These were bilateral agreements between Israel and four Arab states. establishing an unprecedented diplomatic recognition of the Jewish state at the heart of the Arab world. Countries that normalized relations through the Abraham Accords include Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates.
To appreciate how groundbreaking these arrangements are, consider that it was Israeli foreign policy doctrine for its first 30 years to seek diplomatic ties with states on the periphery of the Arab world—countries like Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia—because of the opposition of the Arabs. monarchies to the very existence of Israel was so unyielding. Things began to change in the 1990s after the Oslo Accords, which established the first direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
The Oslo process was a double-edged sword. It softened the traditional opposition of states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to Israel during the negotiations, but also meant that most Arab states (with the exception of Jordan and Egypt) would condition diplomatic recognition of Israel on an agreement that created a Palestinian state. . In effect, it gave the Palestinian leadership a veto on the diplomatic and economic integration of the Middle East.
For most professional American diplomats, the Oslo process was the only path to peace. The men who mastered its nuances and codices were akin to foreign policy priests.
Greenblatt did not care much for the priests of Oslo. The 1993 accords created “an industry that no longer aimed to solve a problem, but an entirely separate allegiance to the ‘peace process’ itself,” he writes. And this process was deeply unfair. According to Greenblatt, the obsession with Oslo resulted in a US policy that regarded the Israeli and Palestinian narratives about the conflict as “equally valid, equally compelling and equally deserving of serious attention”. In short, US policy was “the pursuit of symmetry,” as opposed to fairness. Symmetry is a process that is manipulated to produce equal results. Justice, says Greenblatt, is a process where both sides are treated equally.
In this respect, Greenblatt’s outsider status served him well. He saw no reason why the former president should not have followed through on, for example, his campaign promise to move the US embassy in Israel to its capital in Jerusalem, something all previous presidents since Ronald Reagan had done promised, but never implemented. Greenblatt delights in citing the apocalyptic predictions of Washington insiders, such as former CIA director John Brennan, who claimed the embassy move would “harm US interests in the Middle East for years to come.”
One reason Trump’s Middle East gamble paid off is because by the time he took office, America’s Arab allies were already frustrated with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. Greenblatt writes that in 2017 Arab leaders were still publicly supporting Abbas, “but behind the scenes a different picture seemed to be emerging. Abbas and the ‘Palestinian cause’ had become a diminished presence in a broader political discussion in the region.” He adds, “Increasingly, at least in private talks, Arab governments were considering tentative ties with Israel. At the same time, they were beginning to tire seriously of being asked to finance what looked, increasingly, a chronically corrupt, weak and weak and incompetent organization in Ramallah”.
The other factor that led to the Abraham Accords was the Iranian nuclear deal negotiated by Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. This deal allowed Iran to maintain its industrial-scale nuclear infrastructure and reap the rewards of sanctions relief and an effort to normalize investment in Iran’s economy. All the while, the Iranians were ramping up their shadow war across the Middle East. In this regard, the environment was perfect for uniting Iran’s enemies against a common enemy.
Greenblatt says the first seeds of the deal were planted in Trump’s May 2017 overseas visit to Saudi Arabia. This was the visit that featured Trump and other Arab leaders in the famous photo with their hands in glowing orbs. Greenblatt writes that after the visit, Trump called Israel’s prime minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu, to say, “King Salman feels very strongly and I can tell you that he would like to see peace with the Israelis and the Palestinians.” Greenblatt adds that Trump also told Netanyahu, there is a growing sense among your neighbors that they have common cause with you against Iran.
It must be said that Israel and Saudi Arabia, along with other Arab states, have been secretly working together against Iran throughout the Obama years. And at much lower levels diplomatic normalization was even explored. That said, there is a big difference between smooth cooperation and formalizing diplomatic ties. It took the continued attention of the White House to bring the good vibes of the 2010s back to the Abraham Accords, and for that Trump deserves credit. It also took outsiders like Greenblatt who were confident enough to ignore the advice of the Oslo priests and try something new.
It’s not always the case that the smartest guys in the room don’t know what they’re talking about. But every now and then, experts get it wrong. And when they do, it takes an intelligent stranger to politely decline their advice and try something else.
In the Way of Abraham: How Donald Trump Made Peace in the Middle East — and How to Stop Joe Biden from Unmaking It
by Jason D. Greenblatt
Bad Son, 240 pp., $28
Lake Eli is a contributing editor to Commentary magazine and host i reformatory podcast.
