Spotlight on Terrorism : Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 19 – October 25, 2022)

Lion’s Den operatives (Islamic Resistance in Lebanon website, 23 October 2022).

Attacks in the Damascus area on October 21, 2022 (al-Mayadeen news agency Facebook page, October 22, 2022).

General overview

• The agreement to demarcate the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon is expected to be signed on October 27, 2022. The issue has been the focus of discussion within the Lebanese administration, Hezbollah and other forces at play. Hezbollah holds itself responsible for signing the deal on terms favorable to Lebanon and without special benefits for Israel, and can be expected to praise and publicize the achievement for some time.
• The area around Damascus was attacked twice from the air. Israel was blamed for the attacks, which targeted Syrian regime facilities and locations linked to Hezbollah and Iran.
• The Lebanese have shown considerable support for the Palestinians during recent events in Judea and Samaria, and there have been calls for continued and escalating attacks on Israel.
• The Lebanese army carried out a large-scale operation to confiscate weapons and wanted persons in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon.
• Lebanese intelligence arrested a resident of Marjayoun on suspicion of having ties to Israeli intelligence.
• A meeting was held to coordinate between Hezbollah operatives in southern Lebanon and As-Sa’ica^[1] operatives in the al-Buss refugee camp in Tyre.

Israel-Lebanon

• The agreement defining the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon is expected to be signed on Thursday, October 27, 2022, apparently at the UN headquarters in Naqoura, southern Lebanon. It will define the maritime territorial and economic border between Israel and Lebanon and will run along Line 23. Thus, the Karish gas field lies entirely within Israeli territory and is not mentioned in the agreement. Lebanon will be able to drill for oil and gas in the Qana gas field, most of which lies within its economic territory. Israel will be compensated by companies drilling in the Qana field according to the percentage of the field that lies within its economic territory. The deal has recently been the focus of interest for the Lebanese administration, Hezbollah and other forces at play in Lebanon. It has widespread support, particularly from Hezbollah, which is claiming credit for achieving gains for Lebanon.
• The signing of the agreement has been hampered by Lebanon’s political inertia and its inability to elect a new president to replace Michel Aoun, whose term ends this month, October 2022. The country’s economic conditions continue to deteriorate, fuel prices and basic commodities continue to skyrocket and there are flour shortages and ongoing power outages, all of which affect Lebanon’s need to speed up the signing.
• In preparation for the signing, on October 19, 2022, Michel Aoun met with a delegation of the French firm TotalEnergies, which will develop the Qana gas field, to motivate it to start drilling Block 9. [which is bordered on the south by Line 23 and contains most of the Qana gas field] as soon as possible^[2] (al-Nur, October 18, 2022).
• Most reactions in Lebanon to the signing of the agreement were positive. Most of the forces involved, especially Hezbollah, consider it a benefit to Lebanon and a humiliation to Israel. Much of the achievement was credited to Hassan Nasrallah and his backhandedness, which included threats of military action against Israel. Opponents of Hezbollah pointed out that the threats against Israel should have come officially, from the Lebanese government. Most of the reactions were positive regarding the cooperation between Hezbollah and Michel Aoun in the Lebanon negotiations, which according to them led to most of the country’s achievements. Such cooperation may continue in the future to face Lebanon’s political and economic difficulties.

Hezbollah and South Lebanon

• Fighting broke out in a number of southern Lebanon villages leading to gunfire, injuries and property damage. In the town of Mashghara in the western Beqa’a valley, a fight between two rival clans caused casualties and damage to vehicles. Hezbollah and Amal sent an open letter to local residents calling for calm and began activities to end the conflict and restore calm (Ya Tire website, October 17, 2022). In the southern Lebanon village of Houla, a fight broke out between two clans and led to a shootout that killed one young man and wounded two others; has also caused material damage. The Lebanese army imposed a lockdown on the village to locate the attackers (News Folio website, October 17, 2022; al-Jadeed website, 18 October 2022).
• On October 10, 2022, the Lebanese General Intelligence, operating in the village of Marjayoun in southern Lebanon, arrested Eli Q [sic], born in the village in 1984. He was detained after information received by general intelligence about his attempts to contact Israeli intelligence. Eli Q has reportedly traveled to several countries, including Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Denmark, either for work or as a tourist. While in Ivory Coast, he contacted an individual formerly of the South Lebanese Army who allegedly introduced him to “someone from the Mossad” who asked him about reaching southern Lebanon by sea (al-Nashra website 17 October 2022).
• Nabih Salman Aliq, a former member of the South Lebanon Army who was responsible for security for the town of ‘Aytarun, returned to his village, Bint Jbeil, without any legal action against him. He was accused of being an agent of the IDF Intelligence Unit 504. He fled to Israel with his brothers Hassan and Ali in late 1999 and immigrated to Germany. Ghassan Mula, the lawyer representing the released prisoners in Lebanon, called on the Lebanese authorities to investigate his return to Lebanon and the pardon he received despite collaborating with Israel (Ya Tire website, September 30, 2022).

Palestinians in Lebanon

• The escalation of Palestinian violence in Judea and Samaria was met with sympathy and support from social media in Lebanon:
  • Palestinian terrorist Udai Tamimi, who carried out the shooting attack at the Shuafat checkpoint on October 8, 2022, received encouragement and support on social media during the 11 days that Israeli security forces searched for him. After his shooting attack at the entrance to Ma’aleh Adumim on October 19, 2022, in which he was killed, social media was flooded with videos of his killing and songs praising his courage and respect for his purpose.
  • Hezbollah issued a mourning notice for him praising his sacrifice and the courage of his “struggle” as the highest expression of the entire Palestinian “struggle” (al-Manar website, October 20, 2022).

• • The assassination of Tamer Kilani, a senior operative of the “Lion’s Den” terrorist network, in Nablus on October 23, 2022, was widely covered by the Lebanese media. Social media and Hezbollah-affiliated news agencies were flooded with pictures and threats of retaliation (al-Mayadeen Twitter account, October 23, 2022).
  • On the official website of the Islamic “resistance” in Lebanon, Hezbollah devoted a page to the threats issued by the “Lion’s Den” network in Nablus. It included a picture of Lion operatives and threats against Israel in retaliation for the killing of Tamer al-Kilani.

• On the morning of October 25, 2022, the ground, air and naval forces of the Lebanese army launched an operation to find weapons and wanted Palestinians in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli in northern Lebanon (al-Nashra, October 25, 2022) . In the past, the camp was considered a stronghold of jihadist movements and a source of unrest where riots broke out, mainly fueled by Jaish al-Sham, al-Qaeda and ISIS operatives.
• Khalil Hussein, responsible for Hezbollah’s external relations in the Jabal ‘Amal region, and Abu Wa’il Zalzali, Hezbollah’s responsible for refugee camps, visited the as-Sa’ica center in al-Buss refugee camp near Tyros. . They met with local and organizational leadership. After the meeting they issued a joint statement praising the coordination between Hezbollah and Palestinian organizations along the border with Israel (Ya Tire website, October 23, 2022).
• On October 18, 2022, the Popular Movement for Palestine and the Nation, in collaboration with the Lebanese Order of Doctors, held a meeting at the Palestinian “embassy” in Beirut to show solidarity with the Palestinian “struggle”. The meeting was held after the death of Dr. Abdallah al-Ahmed Abu al-Teen during a clash with the IDF on October 14, 2022 (al-Nur, October 18, 2022).
• A Hamas delegation led by Fathi Hammad, a member of the Hamas politburo and head of the youth affairs office, visited Lebanon. While there he attended a meeting of the “Youth of Hamas”, calling on them for practical “resistance” [terrorist attacks] AGAINST [Israeli] “occupation” until the day of liberation (Hamas website, October 17, 2022). Hamas also met with the Lebanese minister of culture, youth and sports (Hamas website, October 18, 2022).
• At the end of September 2022, they were shot in the Rashidiya refugee camp south of Tire after a fight that escalated into gunfire. One attacker was captured by camp residents and handed over to Lebanese army intelligence (Ya Tire website, October 1, 2022).

SYRIA

• Last week there were several airstrikes, allegedly carried out by Israel, against Syrian regime, Iranian and Hezbollah targets in the Damascus area:
  • At two o’clock in the afternoon on October 24, 2022, the targets of the air defense brigade of the Syrian army were attacked in Kharba, Shehab and Kiswah in the Damascus area. An officer and a soldier were killed (Syrian TV Telegram channel, October 24, 2022). According to another report, sites were also attacked with weapons from Iran for Hezbollah and Iranian militias operating in Syria, and two Syrian soldiers were killed (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, October 24, 2022; al-Jazeera, October 24, 2022).
  • On October 21, 2022, an airstrike was carried out against the airport in Damascus and the southeastern part of the city. Four F-16s reportedly attacked Damascus International Airport with missiles, while other targets were also hit by missiles. Syria’s air defenses reportedly intercepted missiles fired by “Israeli aircraft” and from “Israeli territory” (al-Mayadeen, Twitter account, October 22, 2022). According to another report, the attack in Damascus targeted the warehouses of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, which deals with the transfer of military equipment to Hezbollah. The equipment was disguised as humanitarian aid. The commander of the unit is called Hajj Fadi and operates in cooperation with Unit 190 of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, commanded by Behnam Shahriari (al-Hadath, October 23, 2022).

^[1] Al-Sa’ica is a Palestinian organization which serves as the Palestinian wing of the Baath party in Syria. The organization is a member of the PLO but is not active. It was founded in the late 1960s by Hafez al-Assad, who was president of Syria at the time. ↑

^[2] Block 9 is the region where the Sidon-Qana reservoir was identified as having the potential to produce gas or oil. ↑

^[3] For more information, see the October 19, 2022 bulletin, “Terrorism Spotlight and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, October 4 – 19, 2022.” ↑

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