(Opinion) Lula da Silva and Bolsonaro are striking exceptions to the oversimplification of contemporary leaders in the New Cold War, being either unipolar liberal-globalists or multipolar conservative-sovereignists, since the former can be described as a liberal-globalist multipolar while the second was a conservative-sovereign unipolar.
This is an admittedly imperfect assessment, but one that nevertheless serves to emphasize an important point: each leader has important characteristics that complicate analyzes of their foreign policy.
Also Read: Check out our coverage of the new multipolar world order
The return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (popularly known as Lula) to the Brazilian presidency after Sunday’s runoff election is being interpreted by many as a victory for the world’s multipolar forces.
This assessment is based on Lula da Silva’s independent foreign policy during his previous two terms in office, which prompted the US to orchestrate “Operation Car Wash” against him and his successor as part of the hegemon’s hybrid war unipolar decline in Brazil.
His eventual replacement by Jair Bolsonaro was interpreted as a defeat for the world’s multipolar forces, so his re-election is seen as a victory.
The reality is that everything is a little more complicated than the above oversimplification, which admittedly seemed valid until recently.
Bolsonaro was really only able to get elected because he emerged as a so-called “dark horse” candidate after the US Hybrid War against Brazil discredited the existing political class and thus made the people of his country hungry for a change similar to Trump.
It is also true that he is ideologically aligned with the former US leader, particularly with regard to his pro-Israeli sympathies and conservative domestic views, but that is where their similarities end.
Upon taking office, Bolsonaro failed to fulfill his anti-China campaign promises and defied US demands that Brazil comply with its anti-Russian sanctions following the latest phase of the conflict in Ukraine that began on February 24.
Apparently, this “dark horse” would not allow any US president to ride it.
Instead, Bolsonaro continued to push forward with policies that he and his team were convinced advanced Brazil’s objective national interests as they understood them to be.
While he differed with Lula da Silva on sensitive issues like Venezuela, he aligned with him on others like Russia.
This surprising foreign policy outcome led to five intriguing observations.
First, despite the fact that Bolsonaro’s rise to power was orchestrated by the US, he was ultimately not its pawn.
Second, the common interests he shared with his protégé was more the result of his ideological outlook occasionally aligning with that country’s politics than anything else.
Thirdly, the basis of the same view was his sincere belief in sovereignty as he understood it to be.
Fourth, it was responsible for some foreign policy rifts with the US.
And finally, Bolsonaro thus had his own brand of multipolarity.
As for da Silva, there is no doubt that he too is an ardent believer in multipolarity, albeit as understood from his own ideological perspective.
What he differs from Bolsonaro is that the former is more liberal-globalist while the latter is much more conservative-sovereignist.
To explain, the ideological dimension of the New Cold War can be simplified as the struggle between unipolar liberal globalists (ULG) and multipolar conservative sovereigntists (MCS).
Each of their three related characteristics was briefly touched upon here, which will now be summarized.
ULGs are unipolar about the world system they want to support; liberal in relation to the socio-cultural values they want to spread in their countries; and globalist because they believe that the rest of the world should adopt their models.
Meanwhile, the MCS is multipolar in relation to the world system they want to build; conservative regarding the socio-cultural values they want to protect within their countries; and sovereignist because they do not believe that everyone else should adopt their models.
Lula da Silva and Bolsonaro are striking exceptions to these simplifications as the former can be described as a multipolar liberal-globalist while the latter was a unipolar conservative-sovereignist.
This is obviously an imperfect assessment, but one that nevertheless serves to emphasize an important point.
Each leader has important characteristics that complicate analyzes of their foreign policy and thus explain why they are trying to balance the Golden Billion West led by the US and the Global South led by BRICS and the SCO, of which Brazil is a part.
Starting with Bolsonaro, who served during the most decisive phase of the new Cold War so far, he is considered sympathetic to the spirit of US unipolar leadership, but still wanted to protect his country’s traditional socio-cultural values. by the efforts of the democrats to erode them, for which purpose he tried to strengthen certain aspects of Brazil’s internal sovereignty.
Da Silva, meanwhile, is more open to multipolarity than Bolsonaro, but shares the hyper-liberal views of the US’s democratic ruling elites.
He is also very friendly with the globalist World Economic Forum, which Bolsonaro despised.
This outlook strongly suggests that Lula da Silva’s foreign policy will indeed be as balanced as he signaled in May.
On the one hand, he will almost certainly continue the BRICS-friendly course he first pioneered and which Bolsonaro continued to his credit, but the returning leader will probably also improve Brazil’s relations with the Golden Billion because of the ideologies of their similar hyper-liberals. .
This would be a pragmatic geostrategic outcome in principle similar in a sense to what India successfully managed to do, but the domestic consequences could end up further sharpening internal divisions.
Of course, it remains to be seen how this scenario will play out in practice, but da Silva is a bold ideologue who believes fervently in his views and is thus extremely passionate about implementing them.
He has also just enjoyed historic justice upon his return to the presidency after his scandalous ouster by the US over that declining unipolar hegemon’s hybrid war in Brazil that was orchestrated as punishment for his maverick foreign policy.
These factors complicate predictions about his policies as a part of him may want to oppose the US out of principle, while another part curiously finds itself aligned with it.
The multipolar part of Lula’s oversimplified geostrategic identity places him on the opposite side of the US in the New Cold War, while the liberal-globalist part places him firmly in the camp of the declining unipolar hegemon.
In contrast, the unipolar part of Bolsonaro’s oversimplified geostrategic identity led to predictions that he would always side with the US no matter what, but the conservative-sovereignist one resulted in his defiance of the hegemon’s demands. on sensitive foreign policy issues related to China and especially Russia.
This perspective suggests that the more domestically focused aspects of these leaders’ worldviews, namely liberal-globalist and conservative-sovereignist, may ultimately be more influential than their preferred model of International Relations.
This paradoxical observation could thus lead to some surprising policies from Lula da Silva similar in spirit to those associated with Bolsonaro’s time in office, albeit with potentially different geostrategic outcomes.
For these reasons, it is premature to predict with confidence the foreign policy of this leader returned to the tense context of the new Cold War in which he finds himself.
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