The Gregg Berhalter era began in the desert with a 3-0 friendly win over Panama in January 2019 in front of 9,040 people in Glendale, Arizona.
The journey to Qatar has spanned 56 matches: a sometimes exciting, sometimes bleak journey from the cacti and air-conditioned expanse of the forgotten suburbs of Phoenix to the dense skyscrapers and embarrassing peninsula stadiums that host the sporting event the highest profile in the world.
Here, in an otherwise arid region known more for sand than soccer, come three or more games that will define Berhalter’s tenure as head coach of the U.S. men’s national team — and, if things go horribly sideways, maybe they’ll put an end to it. Given the immense scrutiny the Americans will face as hosts in 2026, Berhalter cannot afford to develop a reputation as a tactician who shrinks under the spotlight.
But judging what would constitute success or failure in Qatar is tricky as this is a young and green group of players, only one of them – DeAndre Yedlin – with previous World Cup finals experience. There is relief that the USA made the tournament at all after the 2018 qualifying debacle and a terrible 2022 campaign that saw Berhalter’s side finish behind Canada and Mexico, securing the third and final automatic spot on the margin of goals on the last day.
The man who led the USA to the 2014 tournament, Jürgen Klinsmann, told Sports Illustrated in 2018, “you build a new skeleton between World Cups.” Not much meat on the bones. But we’re about to learn a lot about the heart, soul and mind of an American generation that has often been heralded as the most talented the nation has ever seen.
Asked on ESPN about expectations, Berhalter spoke about style rather than results: “I think it’s important to go to Qatar and represent our identity as a team. This is not the time to change who we are. We’re an aggressive team, a high-pressure team, we want to use the ball and we’ll find out if we can be successful doing that.”
Impeccable execution of the game plan, but finishing outside the top two in Group B, which also includes Wales, Iran and England, would not reflect well on the plan. It would also be a subpar result. Going back to Italy ’90, the USA has reached the knockout stages in four of the last seven finals, including the last two campaigns, in 2010 and 2014. But the only win after the group stage came in 2002, when Bruce Arena’s side beat Mexico in the round of 16 (and then unfortunately lost to Germany in the quarter-finals).
A finish in Qatar that is consistent with history and reasonable expectations, then, looks like a fighting loss in the round of 16 with Berhalter able to argue that his side have accumulated valuable experience that will serve them well for 2026, when most of his core players should be in their prime. Anything more would be a bonus; anything less a disappointment. But luck will play a part.
The group and knockout stages are “literally two different tournaments,” the 49-year-old said. “Anything can happen on any given day. All you want to do in the knockout tournament is play your best game possible. And if you happen to go out and play your best game possible, go out with your head held high.”
However, such an exit would make it harder to argue that the USMNT has made significant progress in the eight years since the 2014 team bested and lost, reaching the round of 16 but going to a superior Belgium after extra time, despite Tim Howard’s heroics in goal. By the key metric for casual observers – how far did you get in the World Cup? – would indicate stagnation.
The 2022 squad is arguably weaker in forwards and goalkeeping than 2014, when the USA boasted Clint Dempsey and Howard; in other positions it is potentially more dynamic, especially on the wings. Many of the current crop are at major or mid-major European clubs, but 2014 featured steady veterans like DaMarcus Beasley, Michael Bradley, Geoff Cameron and Jermaine Jones, who also spent time in major European leagues.
“On paper they’re the most talented U.S. men’s national team we’ve ever had,” says former forward Herculez Gomez, who played for the U.S. in the 2010 World Cup finals and will be in Doha to coach a show on ESPN+. Compared to previous generations, “This team is much younger, much faster, better in transition, better individually, better technically.”
However, he adds, they lack the veteran savvy of the 2010 and 2014 teams, which had “guys who were a little scrappy, played with a chip on their shoulder” and didn’t shy away from tough assignments away from home.
In 2014, the USA cruised into Brazil, winning the Hex qualifying stage with seven wins and one loss in 10 games for an 11-point cushion over fourth-place Mexico, which advanced through the inter-confederation play-offs.
For the 2022 cycle, the USA won just once on the road and scored 21 goals in 14 games, most of them from close range or simple headers. A typical goal came from the defense failing to cross and an American throwing the ball away. No goals were scored from outside the penalty area and there were only two golazos: a pirouette by Christian Pulisic against Panama and a rocket against Costa Rica by Sergiño Dest.
Apart from age, perhaps the biggest change from eight years ago is not the caliber of those in the squad, but the quality of those not. The talent pool is now much deeper and there are many more Americans at foreign clubs – learning every day, as Gomez points out, from some of the best coaches on the planet. In contrast, most of the 2010 roster spent their late teens playing at American universities.
Berhalter had enough opportunities to almost completely rebuild the team. Only four of the players who missed the 2017 qualifier with Trinidad & Tobago are in the squad for Qatar.
The coach tried dozens of young players in their teens and early 20s, many of whom were playing in the top two divisions in major European countries. He has used 91 players – three more than England’s Gareth Southgate, who has overseen 20 more games. Some of the players Berhalter has used most often — Paul Arriola, Sebastian Lletget, Gyasi Zardes, Reggie Cannon, Zack Steffen — didn’t even make the final 26.
Other names that Berhalter has dismissed or ignored imply the luxury of choice. Teenage attacking midfielder Julian Green, shockingly named in Klinsmann’s 2014 squad, scored with his first touch against Belgium. Now 27, Green made 24 Bundesliga appearances last season for Greuther Fürth, but nobody seriously expected him to be invited to Qatar. He has not made any appearances under Berhalter.
Of the 26 in Qatar, nine are in MLS clubs and the remaining 17 work in Europe. But Berhalter (a former MLS player and coach) could have easily picked a talented roster with just three MLS-based players, Walker Zimmerman, Kellyn Acosta and Jesús Ferreira. Klinsmann, meanwhile, selected 10 MLS players for his 23-man squad, despite his distaste for the league, which he saw as substandard. And the level in MLS has improved since 2014, when there were only 19 teams; this season there were 28.
Klinsmann, for all his long-term grand schemes to rebuild the pipeline from top to bottom, was fired when it looked doubtful the senior team would make it to Russia. Given the extreme importance of the World Cup to the profile of American soccer, his departure was not surprising.
The 2014 group game between the USA and Portugal drew an estimated 25 million viewers on ESPN and Univision. The USA’s final warm-up game before Qatar, a scoreless draw with Saudi Arabia, drew an audience of 226,000 on FS1.
Black Friday’s clash with England is a huge opportunity to attract attention, although the summer tournament in Brazil became a mainstream cultural moment that will be difficult to replicate in 2022 given the early kick-off times for US residents and alternative holiday temptations. season, with football, basketball and hockey in full swing.
However, there are benefits that cannot be measured as easily as viewing figures or the results of a month-long tour. Some are Klinsmann’s legacy: the intensive recruitment of dual nationals, the belief that the U.S. should adopt a more complex and attractive style, an emphasis on youth development and encouraging players to move to Europe.
In 2014 there were growing pains. Klinsmann used the criticism as motivation, but sometimes it was hard to tell whether he was demanding or condescending. A New York Times headline read: How Jurgen Klinsmann plans to make American soccer better (and less American). The vision was bright but blurry.
When Berhalter talks about his team’s identity, he’s discussing tactics, not seeking painful introspection about what it means to be an American football player.
Eight years after the last World Cup final in the USA, there is a stronger domestic league and a deeper pool of global talent. Tactical debate, not an identity crisis. A coach not a psychodramatist. And the promise of greater things in three and a half years. It would be optimistic to expect the US to take a giant step forward in Qatar, but there is no doubt that the road leads up.
